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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

KENNETH B. ELLIS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970294-CA
Priority No. 2

:

ARGUMENT
I. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
A CONTINUANCE UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT.
To preserve an issue for appeal, Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence (1998) requires a moving party to state all claims of
error on the record in the trial court by a "timely objection or
motion . . . , stating the specific ground of the objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the context."

See also,

State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35, cert, denied 493 U.S. 814,
110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989).

"One of the primary reasons

for imposing waiver rules like rule 103 (a) [] is to assure that the
trial court has the first opportunity to address a claim that it
erred.

If the trial court already has had that opportunity, the

justification

for

rigid

waiver

requirements

is

weakened

considerably."

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991).

The State contends that appellate review is precluded in this
case because Ellis argued only that the newly discovered witness
testimony would have impeachment value; "[t]here is nothing in
[Ellis'] argument to suggest to the trial court that the purpose
for seeking the continuance was to obtain substantive, material

evidence."

S.B. 13. 1

A reading of the transcript reveals that Ellis preserved his
claim of error on the issue as he presented it for appeal.

On

appeal, Ellis argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying

the

continuance

because

Meek's2

information

"provided

substantive evidence in support of Ellis' defense theory, as well
as impeach

Irvin's denial of a drug deal and marijuana use."

Appellant's Brief

("A.B.") at 8.

Ellis argued at the hearing

1

The State alternatively contends that this Court should
refuse to review Ellis' issues on appeal. See S.B. 13. The
State specifically argues that a continuance is not merited
because Ellis did not offer adequate foundation for Meek's
testimony and, in any event, the testimony would have impeachment
value alone and therefore a continuance is not merited. Id.
(citing State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982) (court does
not abuse discretion in denying continuance where new information
would only impeach witness)).
As an initial matter, this Court has already made the
determination that Ellis' issue on appeal is meritorious to the
extent that it has allowed the case to go to full briefing. See,
e.g., Utah R. App. P. 10(e) (1998) ("[t]he court, upon its own
motion, . . . may summarily affirm the judgment . . . if it
plainly appears that no substantial question is presented"). If
the State felt that "grounds for review [were] so insubstantial
as not to merit further proceedings and consideration," it should
have filed a motion for summary affirmance within ten days after
filing of the docketing statement. Utah R. App. P. 10(a) (1)
(1998) .
In any event, Ellis' issue as presented for appeal is not
meritless for lack of foundation or substantive grounds. The
State's foundation argument will be addressed in Point II herein.
The State's meritorious issue argument, i.e. whether a
continuance is required where the new evidence will impeach
Irvin's testimony, is fully addressed in Ellis' opening brief.
See A.B. 11-13.
2

In his opening brief, Ellis referred to Meek as "Meek."
The State, on the other hand, uses the spelling "Meek." Due to
the poor quality of the transcript, it is difficult to tell which
is the appropriate spelling. Ellis defers to the State's
spelling and shall use "Meek" throughout this brief and at
argument.
2

before the trial judge:
" [a] lthough we have rested, thi^ ^ new information that
may be important to the case; the reason being is Mr.
Irvin indicated that he doesn't use drugs
He also
indicated that . . . his usual practice is not to buy
drugs from strangers, which if we were to find the person
who he owes money to for drugs . . . that would impeach
that statement that - - h e didn't say that he meant that
for face value, that he meant it sarcastically."
See RecoI'd

(
"
"
" hi" ") ,

The State's narrow reading of the transcript ignores the fact
that reviewing court? do not apply a strict verbati m analysis in
determining whethe

^L-. .

-.

•• •

See State v. Seale, 853 F.2d 862, 874

(Utah 1993)

not

objection

waive

appeal

where

qrcunds

for

nonetheless apparent, irorn L : i e c o I I L e x _ •
a

reviewing

court

t;o construe

an

objection

:i ssi le fc a: appeal.
(defendant did
were

vague

.)i opi i at:e f :: :II :
embrace

reasonab] y i nclirilei within the scope of the objection,"
Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244

(Utah I^9b

but

issues
State v.

Hence, courts look to the

overall context and preclude appeal only where there are extreme
d 3 fferences between the ai : gi lments presented at trial and the issues
presented for appealjl.
3

Indeed, the cases relied on by the State in support of
its argument are distinguishable on this basis. In those cases,
the grounds asserted on appeal were not "reasonably included
within the scope of the objection," Smith, 909 P.2d at 244, and,
in fact, bore little or no legal relationship to those asserted
at trial. See, e.g., State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah
1982) (trial objection that evidence lacked foundation was not
appealable on prejudice g r o u n d s ) ; State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487,
495 (Utah App. 1992) (declining review under Rule 404 where
defendant objected at trial on grounds of improper form, assuming
facts, irrelevance, and Rule 403 exclusion); State v. Ramos, 882
P.2d 14 9, 155 n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (declining review based on
alleged violation of confrontation right where objection at trial
was that question was leading); State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708,
3

Contrary to the State's assertion, the grounds for objection
argued at trial are at least "reasonably included within the scope
of the objection," if not the same as those asserted below.
Ellis

specifically

stated with regard to the newly

Id.

discovered

witnesses, "this is new information that may be important to the
case."
with

R.137[3].

Ellis' use of the word "important" is synonymous

"substantive" and "material."

Likewise,

"case" refers to

Ellis' overall theory that Irvin was not a victim of theft, but
rather a disgruntled party to a drug deal where he forfeited some
money.
Assuming, but not conceding, that Ellis' argument is vague, it
is nonetheless sufficiently

"apparent from the context" of the

transcript such that the argument is preserved for appeal. Utah R.
Evid.

103 (a) .

In the analogous case of Seale, the

defendant

asserted a general hearsay objection to a witness' statement at
trial.

853 P. 2d at 874.

on

grounds

the

that

The trial court overruled the objection

the

consistent statements.
articulated by the court.

statements

Id.
Id.

were

admissible

as

prior

Defendant appealed on the grounds
This Court held that the issue was

713 (Utah App. 1990) (appeal precluded where defendant objected
to evidence as leading at trial, then as inadmissible under Rule
608 and State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), on appeal);
Green v. State, 956 S.W.2d 849, 856 (Ark. 1997) (no preservation
where defendant argued at trial that evidence was improper
impeachment evidence, then argued that it was inadmissible under
Ark. R. Evid. 609 on appeal); State v. Prioleau, 664 A.2d 743,
762 (Conn. 1995) (no preservation where defendant argued lack of
relevancy at trial then appealed on the grounds of improper
impeachment method); State v. Guloy, 705 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Wash.
1985) (no preservation where defendant either did not articulate
grounds of error at trial or argued improper impeachment, then
appealed under hearsay rule).
4

preserved for appeal since it was "'apparent from the context'" of
tl le pi oceedii lg.

la,

•, . .•

-.

i

'"'

Seale's objection was vague, cne judge clearly understooa 1*: when
he ruled that the statement was admissible as a prior
staLeme:
The

consistent

J

.

"

instant

case does not present

such an attenuated

link

between the trial objection and the issue presented for appeal as
i n Seale , whei e thi s Cour t: found pi esei v at:i 01 1 noi iet.1 leless ,
Like Seale, Ellis' issue on appeal is not imported verbatim

Id.
from

hi s statements in the trial transcript, ye1" • s= apparent from, the
context of the proceeding,
trial

that

wbpt-^er "

had

occurred

Id,

just

.

one

- . j.

day

-.-.- :. ei ise thet ne of tl le

before

this

hearing

was

•• was a party to a drug deal that went bad or a victim

of theft.
Additionally, there was no direct evidence to this end except
I

~v -~: his codefendant.

a-i /.

P. 2d

at

243;

see

also

A.L.

luxiiL

T.A

(discussing

Smith, 90 9
heightened

importance of Meek's testimony in light, of biased and conflicting
evidence

presented

at

t::i : :i a ] )

context of Ellis' objections

'

understood

is underscores given that the

judge presided over the trial as over the hearing.
"*9Ra^

Mitchell
renew

objection

at

trial

if

he made

the

same

Cf., State v.

(defendant need not

objection

in

a

pre-trial

hearing and the same judge presided over hearing and trial) ; State
v

Johnson

i

I

I iTTfah 1 ii,rH

According] ;; ' :i t was

clear from the context of Ellis' argument that he sought
5

Meek's

testimony as substantive evidence of his defense. Ellis' objection
as articulated at trial should be construed to find preservation of
the issues given that they are "apparent from the context" of the
proceeding.

Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1).

Based on the foregoing, Ellis adequately preserved his issue
for appeal.

Ellis' objection as articulated provided the trial

court with an opportunity to rule on its merits and a address any
errors.

See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161.

Accordingly, Ellis is not

precluded from raising the issue on appeal.
Even if Ellis did not preserve the issue below, the issue
merits review under the plain error doctrine.

Pursuant to Rule

103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court may take "notice
of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not
brought to the attention of the court."
P.2d at 35-36.
that

" (i)

See also Eldredge, 773

To establish plain error, the appellant must show

[a]n error exists;

(ii) the error should have been

obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful," i.e.,
the error affects a substantive right of the accused.

State v.

Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see also Eldredge, 773 P.2d
at 35.
Under the foregoing, the trial court committed plain error
meriting review of Ellis's appeal even if Ellis did not properly
preserve

the

issue below.4

First, Ellis

4

established

all

the

Generally, when an appellant asserts "plain error" on
appeal, the corollary claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is also raised. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah
App. 1992)(noting symmetry of prejudice requirement under plain
error and ineffective assistance analysis). However, Ellis need
6

factors set
ce:r t.

19 9] ) ,

forth, i11 State v. Oliver, 82 0 P. 2d 4 74
denied,

i , ,A1 ' In

o4J

need

for

continuance,

mateiidl, new evidei ice

moving

party

.

pcessitat m i x

Mil illn I " i i

continuance and, thus, an error exists.

(Utah App.

Id. at 476 (to establish

must

show

new

-

evidence

i

is
*

diligence in preparing, and moving party would suffer prejudice
absent continuance) ; see also A.B. Point I-II (discussing how Ellis
tuii-L-Lj-s yliver cr iteria) .
Next, the "error should have been obvious to the trial court."
Id,

Ut:--- 1~ * teaches that, in the analogous context of requests

for new L-ia^B in light of new evidence, a

•..-?&&&!/

--

where new evidence is independent, corroborative of the defendant's
ca^

,!

•• *

— t e s t e d issue that

key witness] ana _Li.- derenaant i "

[arises] between

State v. James,

794 (Utah 1 9 9 1 ) ; see also Jensen v. Logan, 57 P.2d T.: — -

-

[the

•".. • (Utah

' di si nterested testimony on the

vital point, in a case is very ocant" oi non-existent); State v.
Duncan, ; - • -

f

. •

->: 94 2) (same) .
• ^rv-" *•

'

•-•- been

apparent to the court given that defense counsel argued the motion
for the continuance before the trial court.
- ,, ,

t,

:^ _~*_

P..13'7.
- •-;-" -if-

Even assuming
-juid b e ,

it

was clear enough to alert the court ic ;.ne existence of the error
in the first place.
not raise a claim of ineffective assistance on appeal since his
trial counsel did in fact argue the motion for the continuance
before the trial court.
7

Consequently, the trial court should have known that Meek's
testimony

was

important

since

it

was

material

and

the

only

independent corroborating evidence going to Ellis' defense theory.
See A.B. Point I.A.

Whether the events amounted to a drug buy and

a disgruntled Irvin or whether this was a case of theft was a vital
issue in Ellis' trial.

Id.

The only other evidence concerning

this key issue consisted of Irvin's word against that of Ellis and
Carter,

evidence

that

is

"interested"

by

definition.

Id.

Consequently, where Utah case law is clear, the error in denying
the continuance should have been obvious to the trial court.

See

James, 819 P.2d at 794; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208.
Finally, denial of the continuance constitutes harmful error
since denial of the continuance precluded Ellis from presenting
independent corroborating evidence in support of his defense5.

In

the absence of Meek's testimony, it is difficult to "discovert] the
nature or magnitude of the resulting prejudice to [Ellis] ."
v. Knight, 734 P.2d

913, 920

(Utah 1987)

(noting

State

"difficulties

posed" in assessing prejudice where record is silent or evidence is
absent; appellant need only make a credible showing of prejudice).
Nonetheless, Ellis was probably "material[ly] prejudice[d]"

5

Without benefit of the continuance and the opportunity
to present Meek's testimony, Ellis was precluded from exercising
his "right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his
behalf." State v. Barnes, 409 A.2d 988, 990 (R.I. 1979); see
also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90
L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) ("Constitution guarantees criminal defendants
'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense'")
(citing U.S. Const, amend VI (Compulsory Process and
Confrontation Clauses); U.S. Const, amend XIV (Due Process
Clause)). Id. (citation omitted).
8

and/or

the

"trial

result

would

the

continuance

been

different

had the

-^^ V^_L.

cont j i iuai i• : :: I: € BI i granted '"'
benefit

have

and

the

opportunity

r,c

l^rtner

investigate Meek's statements, Ellis' case went to trial based on
the

c o n f 1 i c t :i i i g

it: • a s t :i in o i :i :i e s

:•f

e a c II

]:: ai, i t: }r

\ \; :i 1 1 I o i 11:

independent evidence going to the vital issue concerning whether
this was a theft or a drug bi ly

Given that * - evidence before the

court was subj ect 1: :: • J ai yi i lg :i nterprinfluenced to convict in the absence of Meek's testimony.

See

James, 819 P.2d at 794 (information from "neutral" source assumes
"different

quality

in the eyes

< > I I hi

jurors

who assess

f- he

credibility of the witnesses"); see also A.B. Point II (discussing
how

denial

of

continuance

resulted

*

material

prejudice

different trial outcome in light of dli tacLors .in K.I 1 :i s

/

case).

Based or- the foregoing, Ellis issue on appeal merits review
under

'*• -

,:

*'

---rror" doctrine even if he did not adequately

preserve the issue f or appea 1 i n the 11 ia ] court.
Evid.

See Utal l I;;!

103(d).
II. ELLIS ESTABLISHED THAT THE NEW EVIDENCE WAS MATERIAL
TO THE ISSUE OF GUILT FOR PURPOSES OF THE OLIVER ANALYSIS
FOR DETERMINING THE NECESSITY OF A CONTINUANCE.
The State contends that Ellis did not establish the necessity

c-

grounds: 1 ) Meek's testimony is

immaterial ;...-• •..--. . -a sue ol gui.:.^; and ,:) Kills did not show

^::z\z

the unnamed witness identified by Meek was available to testify or

9

: 11 Ie

that the testimony would be material.6
A.

S.B. 16-22.

Meek's Testimony:

The State initially asserts that "defense counsel was unable
to positively confirm Meek's alleged acquaintance with Irvin [and]
the trial court might reasonably have felt less than certain that
Meek was actually referring to [Irvin.]"7

S.B.17.

The State's contention is not supported by the Record nor
reasonable on its merits. First, the name "Joshua Irvin" is unique
and is not likely to be duplicated within Cyprus High School, where
Meek knew Irvin.

R.137[2] . Second, although Irvin testified that

he grew up in Kearns, he testified that he resided in West Valley
at

the

time

of

trial.

R.134[l].

Contrary

to

the

State's

suggestion, this fact does not discredit Meek's assertion that he
knew Irvin from Cyprus High School in West Valley; Irvin could have
commuted to the neighboring city of West Valley from Kearns, or he
could have moved to West Valley by the time he went to high school.
Finally, Meek indicated that Irvin was tall and had long blond

6

The State also contends that Ellis did not establish
prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance. S.B. 2225. Ellis submits on his opening brief as his rebuttal to the
State's unfounded assertion that the outcome of trial was not
changed as a result of the denial of the continuance. See A.B.
24-31.
7

The State challenges the materiality of Meek's statements
on a number of grounds, including speculativeness of the content
and relevancy to the issues before the trial court. Each of
these arguments are addressed in Ellis' opening brief and need
not be reiterated here. See A.B. 15-16 (discussing why the
content of Meek's testimony is not speculative), 9-19 (discussing
materiality of Meek's testimony). The remainder of the State's
challenges to the materiality of Meek's testimony will be
addressed herein.
10

hair.

R.137[2].

Although there is nothing

in the record to

confirm or deny Meek's description of Irvin, it seems unlikely that
defense counsel would have presented such information to the judge,
who had seen Irvin, if it were inconsistent with Irvin's overall
appearance. Accordingly, Meek communicated sufficient information
to establish that he was referring to the same Irvin that accused
Ellis and Carter of theft.
The

State

also

contends

that

there

were

concerns

of

authenticity since Meek's testimony was not presented in affidavit
form.

See S.B.17.

However, as the State itself acknowledges,

"Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
require that an affidavit accompany a motion."

[(1998)], does not
S.B.17.

Moreover,

the cases cited by the State in support of its assertion do not
actually hold that an affidavit weighs in favor of granting a
continuance upon newly discovered information.

Indeed, State v.

Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah
1993) , stands

for

the

opposite

proposition

that

denial

of

a

continuance is proper where an affidavit exists because the moving
party has access to the information in an alternative format if not
through a live witness.

Id. at 714-15.

State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1988), likewise does not
support

the

State's

claim because

the recommended

use

of

the

affidavit in that case had nothing to do with the authenticity of
the anticipated testimony.
continuance

but

did

not

The defendant in Linden moved for a
provide

names

or

addresses

of

the

anticipated witnesses, claiming that he was unable to do so due to
11

his incarceration.

Id. at 13 87.

The trial court denied the

continuance and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Id. at 1388.

The

Court reasoned that the "record before us is completely barren .
. . [and] Defendant prepared no affidavit to show that he attempted
in good faith to contact his witnesses but was unable to do so."
Id. at 1387.

Hence, the Linden Court was recommending use of an

affidavit to show that defendant made a good faith effort to meet
his burden to "place that information before the trial court," id. ,
and not to establish authenticity of the anticipated testimony.

As

noted above, Ellis met his burden to place all the information that
he had before the court. In any event, the State did not contest
Ellis' good faith effort below, thereby implicitly indicating its
satisfaction with Ellis' effort.

R.137.

By a similar token, the State misrelies on James.

In that

case, the Supreme Court cited State v. Duncan, 132 P.2d 121 (Utah
1942) , a case in which the use of an affidavit was noted because it
was the only "disinterested testimony on the vital point" and other
evidence was "scant."

James, 819 P.2d at 794 n.41.

Contrary to

the State's assertion, therefore, the James and Duncan decisions do
not recommend affidavits to establish authenticity of anticipated
testimony

so

much

as

they

find

them

material

when

no

other

disinterested evidence is available.
The State finally challenges Meek's testimony on foundational
grounds,

stating

it

is

nothing

more

than

"evidence

of

an

unsubstantiated use of an unrelated drug, [i.e., methamphetamine
versus marijuana,]

remote in time, for the purpose of showing
12

current drug use."

S.B.18.

The State ignores the fact that Meek's testimony responds
directly to Irvin's preliminary hearing testimony that it was not
his "usual practice" to solicit drugs from strangers and his later
trial testimony that he did not use marijuana at all and that he
made his preliminary hearing statement out of sarcasm.

R.134[25].

The use of prior conduct to impeach a witness is a legitimate trial
objective under Rule 608(b) (1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 608(b)(1)

See

(1998) (although generally inadmissible,

"[s]pecific instances of conduct of a witness . . . , if probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired

into on cross-

examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness")8.
8

The State incidentally asserts that the "alleged specific
instances of Irvin's prior methamphetamine use and drug purchase
would almost certainly be excluded under Rule 608, Utah Rules of
Evidence." S.B.14. The State then quotes Rule 608 in part,
leaving out the section quoted above which provides for admission
of specific instances of bad conduct to impeach a witness on
cross-examination. See Utah R. Evid. 608(b)(1) (quoted above).
The State likewise misrelies on State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d
702 (Utah App.), cert, denied 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993), which is
distinguishable from the instant case. In Martinez, the
defendant was charged with distribution and asserted an
entrapment defense. Id. at 704. The facts alleged that the
undercover officer at one point pretended to snort cocaine with
defendant during the investigation. Id. at 703. The officer at
trial testified that she was not a drug user. Id. at 704.
Defendant moved to admit eyewitness testimony that the officer
had used cocaine in the past. Id. The trial court denied the
motion and this Court affirmed. Id. at 704-05. The Court
reasoned that the evidence was "extrinsic" and "interjected an
irrelevant issue." Id. at 705 (quoting United States v.
Phillips, 888 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1989) ("testimony [that
undercover agents used cocaine at party during investigation of
defendant] would . . . create a swearing contest about a matter .
. . 'far removed from the case'").
Contrary to Martinez, information concerning Irvin's past
13

In turn, Meek's testimony assumes a material and substantive
quality since the evidence going to the controverted

issue of

whether this was a drug buy or a theft consists only of the
contradictory testimony of Irvin against that of Ellis and Carter.
As noted by the James Court, "[e]vidence from a neutral third
party, [Meek,] is not merely cumulative. . . . It is of a different
kind and nature than defendant's statements, and it certainly could
have a different quality in the eyes of the jurors who assess the
credibility of the witnesses."
Reed, 820 P.2d

479, 482

819 P. 2d at 794; cf. , State v.

(Utah App. 1991)

(in rape case where

evidence consisted only of defendant's testimony against victim's,
evidence of drug paraphernalia discredited defendant's testimony
that he was not under influence and thus did not force victim when
he had intercourse with her).

Hence, Meek's testimony is material

insofar as it corroborates Ellis' testimony on a contested issue

drug use and purchasing habit goes to the central issue of
whether the events of this case amounted to theft or a foiled
drug deal by impeaching his claim that he did not use drugs or
buy them from strangers. See, e.a., State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479,
481-82 (Utah App. 1991) (evidence of drug paraphernalia found
during search of rape suspect's home admissible under Rule
608(b)(1) to impeach his trial testimony that he was not under
the influence when he had intercourse with victim); State v.
Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 824 (Utah App. 1990) (pursuant to Rule
608(b) (1), cross-examination of defendant about cocaine use was
proper to impeach testimony that he forged checks for money to
move into another house); State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah
1979) (evidence that defendant pointed gun at manslaughter victim
one week prior to incident admissible to impeach defendant's
statement that he did not do so). Consequently, contrary to the
State's assertion, Meek's testimony about Irvin's prior drug use
and purchasing habit would be admissible under Utah R. Evid.
608(b) (1) to impeach his testimony. Moreover, such evidence was
relevant to the central issue in dispute, namely whether Irvin
was robbed or was a disgruntled participant in a drug deal.
14

while discrediting Irvin's claims against drug use and purchasing9.
In light of the foregoing and Ellis' argument in his opening
brief, Point I.A., Meek's testimony is sufficiently material to
merit a continuance in this case.
B.

Testimony Of The Drug Supplier:

The State challenges the need for the continuance on the
grounds

that

the

substance

of

the

speculative and, hence, immaterial.
As

with

Meek's

testimony,

supplier's

testimony

was

See S.B.22.

Ellis

defined

the

anticipated

content of the supplier's testimony when he stated, "if we were to
find the person who

[Irvin] owes money to for drugs and

[they]

actually went to school together and were friends together, that
would impeach [Irvin's] statement."

R.137[3].

Hence, the showing

of materiality here does not fail for lack of definitiveness since
Ellis presented enough information to the court to "pass upon its

9

The State relies on State v. Humphreys, 707 P.2d 109
(Utah 1985), State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987), and
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) in asserting that
evidence concerning Irvin's "unsubstantiated" drug use, "remote
in time," is not material to the instant case and therefore a
continuance is not warranted. However, these cases are
distinguishable in that none of the evidence that the parties
sought to introduce in the those cases was necessary to impeach a
key witness on a vital point. See Humphreys, 707 P.2d at 109-10
(continuance not warranted where new witness would only offer
evidence that would mitigate defendant's liability); see, e.g.,
DeAlo, 748 P.2d at 199 (finding error to admit during State's
case in chief evidence of defendant's involvement in interstate
cocaine distribution scheme because it bore no relation to
cocaine seized in Utah or resulting distribution charge);
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 428-29 (finding error to admit during
State's case in chief evidence of prior rape conviction and two
incidences of assault which did not result in convictions since
they were remote in time and had no relation to current
aggravated assault charge).
15

materiality."10

State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982).

Moreover, the supplier's testimony would directly refute Irvin's
denial that he purchased drugs in the past.

See A.B. Point I.A.

Accordingly, Ellis fulfilled his burden to define the content of
the hoped-for testimony and its materiality before the trial court.
See

Oliver,

820

P.2d

at

476

(moving

party

must

establish

materiality); Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752 (party fails to establish
materiality

where

the

content

of

hoped-for

testimony

is

so

speculative that trial court cannot assess materiality).
The State alternatively contends that a continuance is not
merited

because

Ellis

"patently

failed"

to make

the

required

showing that the unknown drug supplier indicated by Meek would be
available to testify within a reasonable time.

S.B.21-22.

As

noted by Ellis in his opening brief, a continuance was needed to
discover the identity and the whereabouts of the drug supplier in
the first place.

Consequently, Ellis was not required, and indeed

could not make that availability showing at that juncture in the

10

The State inappropriately relies on State v. Williams,
712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) and Humphreys, 707 P.2d at 109-10.
In those cases, the defendants could not offer the trial court
any information about the hoped-for testimony. See Williams, 712
P.2d at 222 (defendant admitted he "[had] no idea" what new
witness would testify to); Humphreys, 707 P.2d at 109-10
(defendant merely indicated that hoped-for witness would offer
information that would mitigate defendant's liability for theft
by deception). Ellis, by contrast, offered a definite outline of
the supplier's information that is qualitatively different than
the ambiguous and open-ended assertions exemplified in Humphreys
and Williams. Consequently, the State's reliance on those cases
is misplaced.
16

proceeding11.

See A.B. 19-20.

In any event, the continuance is merited by Meek's testimony
alone, with or without establishing the availability of the unknown
supplier or the materiality of his testimony. See supra Point II;
A.B.

Point

I-II.

Accordingly,

the fact that Ellis could not

establish the availability of the drug supplier indicated by Meek
does not negate the need for the continuance in this case12.
CONCLUSION
Due to the trial court's abuse of discretion in denying a
continuance, Ellis respectfully requests this court to reverse
his conviction and remand for a new trial.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument.

11

The State also speculates that the drug supplier would
not make himself available for trial. Ellis, however, could
subpoena the supplier or secure an affidavit from him based on a
showing of unavailability.
12

The State relies on a Rhode Island case, Barnes, 409
A.2d at 991, for the proposition that a continuance is not
merited where the moving party requests it to discern the
whereabouts of a possible witness. Barnes is distinguishable
from the instant case in that the sole justification for seeking
the continuance was to discover the location of the absent
witness. Id. Moreover, the defendant in Barnes failed to
exercise due diligence in otherwise locating the witness before
trial commenced. Id. Ellis, by contrast, had an alternative
justification for the continuance (Meek) and diligently prepared
for trial before requesting the continuance. See A.B. Point I.A,
I.C.
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